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 Bioethics in Denmark 
 Moving from First- to Second-Order Analysis? 
 MORTEN EBBE JUUL  NIELSEN and  MARTIN MARCHMAN  ANDERSEN 
 Abstract:  This article examines two current debates in Denmark—assisted suicide and the 
prioritization of health resources—and proposes that such controversial bioethical issues 
call for distinct philosophical analyses: fi rst-order examinations, or an applied philosophy 
approach, and second-order examinations, what might be called a political philosophical 
approach. The authors argue that although fi rst-order examination plays an important role 
in teasing out different moral points of view, in contemporary democratic societies, few, if 
any, bioethical questions can be resolved satisfactorily by means of fi rst-order analyses 
alone, and that bioethics needs to engage more closely with second-order enquiries and the 
question of legitimacy in general. 
 Keywords :  assisted suicide ;  prioritization ;  health resources ;  philosophical analysis 
 Overview 
 Viewed through the lens of public opinion, Denmark counts as a liberal or permis-
sive country concerning key areas of bioethics, such as abortion and assisted 
reproduction; as a moderately liberal one with regard to support for stem cell 
research;  1  and, perhaps surprisingly, as a moderately bioconservative one in matters 
of food resources, genetically modifi ed organisms, and so on.  2  Moreover, there is 
a very high level of public support for the country’s policy of free and equal access 
to the vast majority of health services, primarily excluding dental services for 
adults and most forms of cosmetic surgery, and including some level of user pay-
ment for most drugs. 
 Two Current Debates in Denmark: Voluntary Euthanasia and the Prioritization 
of Health Resources 
 In general, on broadly bioethical issues there is a high level of agreement and accor-
dance between voters and political parties, whether or not they are in government. 
However, there is a notable gap between the public’s attitude and that of members 
of parliament as concerns one question: namely, voluntary euthanasia (including 
assisted suicide). A survey fi nds that 71 percent of the public is in favor of legalizing 
voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide, whereas only 20 percent of members of 
parliament (MPs) are in favor of doing so.  3  Traditionally, MPs are to vote according 
to their own conscience on matters of morality (in reality: bioethical questions) and 
not according to their party line; moreover, there is no discernible right-left distribu-
tion of MPs supporting or opposing legalization. In this chapter, we offer some 
refl ections on this discrepancy, which is atypical of the Danish political practice. 
 As mentioned, free and equal access to healthcare enjoys widespread support both 
in the public and among MPs. Surveys show that the topic of health consistently 
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fi gures among the top three political priorities of the Danes, and, not to put too 
fi ne a point on it, arguing for cuts in the health budget is tantamount to political 
suicide. Nevertheless, questions about prioritization in health, especially in con-
junction with worries over an aging population and the ongoing economic crisis, 
are more and more pressing. There seems to be a growing recognition of the fact 
that healthcare resources are fi nite; that the possibilities for appropriating a larger 
proportion of public fi nances for health purposes are limited, given competing 
demands for other public services; and fi nally that the demand for health services 
is ever growing. However, few, if any, politicians, academics, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), or other civil society organizations have attempted—or 
risked—to be clearer about which values and principles should inform prioritiza-
tion. This has spurred the quango (quasi-autonomous regulatory agency) Danish 
Council of Ethics (discussed subsequently) to try to place the question of prioriti-
zation on the agenda of public debate. We offer here some (rather abstract) refl ec-
tions on why it is so diffi cult to openly debate issues of prioritization of healthcare 
resources in the context of a broadly egalitarian society, and some tentative sug-
gestions as to how bioethicists could contribute to progress in this diffi cult debate. 
 Two Levels of Analysis 
 Controversial bioethical issues, such as voluntary euthanasia and the prioritiza-
tion of healthcare resources, call for two distinct philosophical analyses: fi rst-order 
examination of the cases in the light of various established moral theories (the 
applied philosophy or fi rst-order approach) and second-order enquiries into the 
question of legitimacy in the light of reasonable pluralism (what might be called a 
political philosophical or simply a second-order approach). We believe that in con-
temporary democratic societies, few, if any, bioethical questions can be resolved 
(politically) satisfactorily by means of fi rst-order analyses alone. Citizens cannot be 
expected to converge seamlessly toward one fi rst-order morality that can underpin 
policies on most bioethical issues. This situation calls for second-order analyses: in 
the light of the pluralism of fi rst-order moral views, which policies can form the 
basis for a reasonable, overlapping consensus? We shall argue that fi rst-order 
examination is indeed important to tease out the implications of various moral 
points of view vis-à-vis concrete, bioethical questions, but that bioethics needs to 
engage more closely with second-order enquiries and the question of legitimacy in 
general. Denmark might be an interesting case for such analyses. 
 Academic and Institutional Structures 
 There are no large, designated centers of bioethical research in the country; how-
ever, there is a vibrant tradition of doing applied ethics at both philosophy depart-
ments and various health, public health, or bioscience institutions. From both a 
public debate and a policy point of view, however, the most important institution 
is the quango Danish Council of Ethics.  4  Following an arm’s-length principle, 
the council gives advice to the government and endeavors to spur public debate 
on biotechnological and more broadly health-related ethical questions. The coun-
cil was created in 1987 by the government in the wake of controversies over in 
vitro fertilization and similar biotechnological breakthroughs. In its now more 
than 25 years of existence, only very few of its members have been academic 
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philosophers. Members are appointed by a government committee and by the 
ministers of the relevant areas (health, environment, etc.). The council is often seen 
as more conservative than the population on key issues such as assisted suicide or 
new technologies, and it attracts a good deal of media attention. This might be due 
to the (perhaps ironic) common confusion about the role and powers of the coun-
cil, which, apart from stimulating discussion, are only to give advice and make 
reports to parliament, not to legislate or perform any adjudicative role. Often, the 
council is seen as an offi cial state branch issuing ethical verdicts on deeply contro-
versial issues—or perhaps the media spins their stories in a way that fi ts with such 
an interpretation. 
 Case 1: Prioritization of Healthcare Resources 
 Seen in a global light, Denmark is a highly egalitarian nation: its GINI coeffi cient, 
measuring the inequality among levels of income, wavers around 0.24, putting the 
country among the top three most egalitarian as concerns economic resources,  5  
and marginal tax rates are between 48.5 and 69.1 percent, according to which 
method is being used.  6  Free and equal access to a range of health services is seen 
as one of the cornerstones of the social model. Private hospitals, which are fi nanced 
mostly by private insurance and public sector out-contracting, have been accepted 
as an add-on to the model. However, private sector hospitals account for only a 
fraction of resources spent, that is, approximately less than 3 percent. 
 It is on this highly egalitarian background that one should read the controversy 
over prioritizing health resources. Of course, equality per se is only half the story: 
it is easy to achieve equality if one simply lowers the quality of services to a mini-
mum. What welfare-state-supporting Danes expect is, of course, not only equal 
but also high-quality services, and hence the controversy. There is an ingrained 
discomfort to the idea that health services cannot be “the best” across the board, 
and perhaps an even greater dislike of the idea that some should receive the best 
while others cannot. Moreover, the background is not only egalitarian but also, to 
a high degree, one of consensus and cooperation. While acknowledging differ-
ences of both objective and ideological interests among citizens, the Danish model 
(and history) of democracy has traditionally emphasized a consensual rather than 
a confl ict or agonistic model of political life. 
 It is hard to paint a cogent picture of how prioritization is being handled in the 
Danish healthcare sector. There is no equivalent to the United Kingdom’s National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE),  7  and there is no offi cial policy 
refl ecting one or the other principle of prioritization. The overall health budget is, 
of course, a matter for parliament, but regional administrative bodies can priori-
tize to some extent within the budget, and a certain amount of on-the-ground (in 
the clinic, hospital, etc.) prioritization is bound to take place as well. 
 Discomfort about the necessity of facing challenges of prioritization is not suf-
fi cient to quell the discussion. One sign that this is so is that the Danish Council of 
Ethics has issued a report concerning prioritization.  8  The contributors, who 
include a broad range of politicians, medical experts, public health administrators, 
philosophers, representatives of NGOs, and so on, advocate no unifi ed take on the 
question of prioritization. In fact, they hardly advance any concrete, philosophi-
cally informed views on prioritization at all. Although their publication—if it 
is indeed a precursor to an open debate on prioritization—can, and should, be 
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viewed as an important stepping stone, it is also perhaps typical of the uncertainty 
and general feeling of unease as concerns taking a defi nite stand on the issue of 
prioritization. 
 We submit that bioethics needs to concern itself less with fi rst-order moral 
analysis and more with second-order political philosophy approaches, specifi -
cally theories of distributive justice and public reason in the light of (reasonable) 
pluralism—or at least that bioethicists need to inform themselves more about 
such theories. Of course, prioritization is from the beginning a distributive ques-
tion, so we might be pushing at an open door. In any event, the issue of prioriti-
zation is not one that is solved by applying some fi rst-order moral theory (or 
distributive principle, for that matter). For any principle of prioritization there is 
bound to be important and reasonable objections, hence the need to move from 
fi rst-order principles that aim at being  true to second-order principles that aim at 
being  reasonable , or, as far as possible,  legitimate . The move from fi rst-order ethical 
thought to second-order discussions of legitimacy will almost always imply dis-
pensing with the notion of an ideal solution—the kind of solution that various 
theoretical, ethical points of view aim to provide. Given reasonable pluralism, the 
ideal is not the ideal, if you allow the play on words. Rather, “in an account of real 
public reason, the aim of moral theory is not to paint pictures of an ideal world but 
to show how we can achieve a real social morality that meets the test of moral 
acceptability of the real reason of moral agents.”  9  
 It might sound as if the peculiarly egalitarian and consensus-seeking background 
on which the Danish debate of prioritization is to take place would make such a 
move easier. However, we speculate that, precisely due to that background, the 
debate and the move might become harder. The Danish welfare state is by and large 
the product of a series of compromises in which a predominantly moderate social-
democratic majority of working- and middle-class citizens and associations gradu-
ally has moved the distributive profi le toward more equality in key areas such as 
income and education. However, it is probably easier to compromise in areas such 
as minimum wages than it is on the prioritization of healthcare resources, in which 
access to a given procedure or drug is, or is seen as being, an all-or-nothing issue. As 
concerns a broad range of social issues—unemployment benefi ts, public student 
funding, paid holidays, public pensions, and so on—compromises are relatively 
easy to achieve because even small increments  are benefi ts, and because trade-offs 
between various benefi ts and burdens offer themselves more readily to the involved 
parties. However, prioritization of scarce health resources will inevitably mean that 
someone—the elderly, the ones with rare or expensive or “unsexy” diseases—
will lose. Therefore trade-offs are much harder to imagine. The egalitarian 
Danish consensus model is, in spirit at least, built on the principle that no one 
should be left (completely) behind. But all plausible forms of prioritization, 
given moderate scarcity of resources and unlimited demand,  will imply that 
some are left behind—at least relatively speaking. Hence, a compromise on the 
 principle(s) to be used to guide prioritization is not easily forthcoming. On the 
other hand,  not prioritizing—that is, not having offi cial and transparent prin-
ciples of prioritizing—does not mean that the problem of scarce resources and 
unlimited demand disappears: prioritizing will simply take place in forms and 
ways that are more or less invisible to the public. 
 Such distributive problems are, of course, the bread and butter of political theorists 
and philosophers. That is not to say that political philosophy provides a panacea 
Morten Ebbe Juul Nielsen and Martin Marchman Andersen
330
to the problem of legitimacy given pluralism and reasonable disagreement—far 
from it. However, we submit that bioethics could benefi t from engaging more 
closely with political philosophy in the endeavor to fi nd legitimate models of pri-
oritization, and that the Danish case might be very interesting to follow in this 
regard. 
 Case 2: Voluntary (Active) Euthanasia or Assisted Suicide 
 Passive euthanasia, or withholding medical treatment, is not illegal and is accepted 
in Denmark. However, voluntary (active) euthanasia, when a doctor or some other 
person actively ends the life of a consenting patient, or helps a patient to take his 
or her own life, is illegal. As already mentioned, there is a stark contrast between 
the citizenry and the politicians in this regard: 71 percent of the public is in favor 
of legalizing voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide, whereas only 20 percent 
of MPs are in favor of doing so. 
 The Danish Council of Ethics takes a conservative approach similar to that of 
the members of parliament, though with some minority dissent.  10  As is usual for 
the council, there are no fi nal recommendations, executive summaries, or other 
statements of the council’s conclusions. However, a massive majority (15 out of 17) 
recommends that there should be no changes to the laws regarding euthanasia. 
Two members recommend further investigation into the likely consequences of 
allowing voluntary euthanasia, and the same two members recommend that we 
should consider allowing assisted suicide.  11  The council seems to put great empha-
sis on the availability of palliative medicine as an alternative that, barring some 
fringe cases, renders euthanasia obsolete.  12  Against this, it could reasonably be 
argued that the council does not adequately address the plight of those patients 
who do not want hospice or palliative care to begin with; fear of pain is not the 
only reason why some persons want to control their own end of life. 
 In any event, the schism between parliament (and the council) and the popula-
tion is tangible. Naturally, many explanations of this discrepancy are available: 
Perhaps politicians lack the courage to face up to their responsibility to follow the 
democratic majority because they fear that they will not win any new votes but 
lose some of their existing ones. Maybe citizens are not informed enough about 
palliative care or have not thought through the implications of legislation. Perhaps 
ethical councils have a tendency to recruit, or produce, ethical absolutists. Rather 
than spending more time speculating about the causes of the discrepancy, we 
move forward by raising the same point as we did earlier in relation to the ques-
tion about prioritization. We also go a bit further toward proposing some ways 
ahead that are hopefully illustrative. 
 When two citizens, A and B, stand opposed on the question of voluntary eutha-
nasia, it seems like compromise, in a strict sense, is impossible: either voluntary 
euthanasia is legal (given a string of further qualifi cations and conditions, of 
course) or it is illegal.  13  This is unfortunate if one allows for the possibility that 
neither citizen is  unreasonable in holding his or her point of view, because whether 
or not the state legalizes voluntary euthanasia, the ( ex hypothesi reasonable, or at 
least not unreasonable) point of view of one of the citizens is not accommodated, 
and hence he or she is not treated with due respect, given liberal premises. 
Moreover, because the pluralism in question is reasonable, then, in practice, no 
amount of fi rst-order discussion about and clarifi cation of the morality of 
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euthanasia and related concepts will  guarantee consensus, hence the need to move 
to second-order discussions of legitimacy. 
 Legitimacy is, of course, not a neutral concept. It is nevertheless fair to say that 
liberal political philosophy (from Rawls and onward) is by far the school of 
thought that has paid the most attention to the specifi c problem involved, namely, 
legitimacy given reasonable pluralism and given the reasonability of the involved 
parties . Like legitimacy,  reasonability is not an uncontroversial concept, but most 
seem to accept that reasonability is not (primarily, at least) connected with the 
content of doctrines and ideals held by any given agent. Rather, the concept refers 
to a  way of holding or having a doctrine or ideal. To elaborate, we need here briefl y 
to introduce a distinction between two ways of being opposed to some policy, act, 
or practice. Suppose citizen C is opposed to homosexuality. C can then be opposed 
to homosexuality in two very different ways. A  liberal-compatible and  reasonable 
way of being so inclined means, roughly, that C does not support homosexuality 
(this might include things such as not wanting to be around homosexuals, refus-
ing to watch movies that depict homosexuality, campaigning against homosexual-
ity, and many other things conventionally deemed intolerant or illiberal), but that 
C nevertheless supports laws that allow homosexuals to engage in their practices 
and that refrain from interfering actively with their rights to do so. A  liberal-incom-
patible and  unreasonable way of being opposed to homosexuality entails precisely a 
denial of the last part of this defi nition. Note that reasonability does not entail giv-
ing up one’s personal preferences and ideals, nor does it require any kind of posi-
tive attitude toward specifi c acts or preferences. It also does not necessarily require 
any kind of close scrutiny and assessment of the values and principles underlying 
such acts. Moreover, reasonability entails a readiness to accept principles regulat-
ing the affairs of all, given reciprocal respect for the same principles by other 
parties. 
 Approaching the question of voluntary euthanasia in the light of reasonability 
invites the following line of thought: clearly, it is unreasonable for anyone to 
demand of another person that he or she should volunteer for euthanasia. But 
conversely, it seems unreasonable for an opponent of voluntary euthanasia to 
demand of another person that he or she should refrain from undergoing eutha-
nasia.  14  The upshot is that we should let voluntary euthanasia be an individual 
decision, but with strong emphasis on protection of those who manifestly are 
opposed to becoming subjects of euthanasia. Evidently, individuals can and will 
be affected by collective decisions (or their absence). If it is plausible that legaliz-
ing voluntary euthanasia leads to, for example, preemptive killing of the elderly to 
“prevent suffering,” then individuals opposed to euthanasia are indeed not unrea-
sonable if they demand that euthanasia should remain unlawful. However, this 
and similar slippery-slope-style arguments seem not to be well founded in empiri-
cal research.  15  In any event, strong emphasis on institutional safeguards against 
misuse is well justifi ed independently of fear of various slippery slopes. 
 We are of course aware that many argumentative steps need to be fi lled in for 
the conclusion to be logically compelling, but note that it is reached without much 
inquiry into fi rst-order questions about the moral acceptability of euthanasia: it 
follows from admitting reasonable disagreement or pluralism concerning some 
question, and from a spirit of wanting to fi nd mutually justifi able and binding 
principles in the light of such disagreement. From this it might be taken that we 
would argue for the redundancy of fi rst-order analyses. This is not our view: 
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careful scrutiny of real bioethical problems in the light of various cogent moral 
theories is not rendered obsolete. In order to establish the possible grounds for 
compromise and accommodation of various (reasonable) points of view, fi rst-
order analyses will play a crucial role. In other words, there is plenty of room for 
“classic” bioethical inquiry. 
 Concluding Remarks: Bioethical Enquiry at a Crossroads? 
 We have focused on two current bioethical issues that are pressing in a Danish 
context. One is the question of assisted suicide/voluntary euthanasia, where there 
is a marked difference between voters and politicians regarding whether or not it 
should be legalized. We have offered a model, inspired by recent turns in liberal 
political philosophy, that might not be ideal but nonetheless seems better equipped 
to deal with the question of legitimacy, given reasonable pluralism, than any 
model built solely on fi rst-order moral enquiry. The other issue concerns the pri-
oritization of healthcare resources, a discussion that in the peculiarly egalitarian 
Danish setting generates so much unease that it is very diffi cult to move ahead. 
However, because prioritization is a necessity, avoiding open, yet potentially pain-
ful, deliberation seems unreasonable. Because prioritization is fi rst and foremost a 
distributive problem, bioethics needs to connect with contemporary discussions 
in political philosophy. 
 Classical bioethical fi rst-order analyses are important. They tease out the impli-
cations of considered ethical points of view. Often they show implications that we 
do not expect to see, or at the very least they clarify how and why one might arrive 
at a given conclusion. From the point of view of reaching legitimate decisions that 
minimize forms of democratic discontent, close analysis of various considered 
views, their foundations, and their implications is a crucial step. However, com-
bining this form of analysis with second-order analyses of the grounds for com-
promise and reasonable accommodation of pluralism provides the most directly 
relevant form of study of bioethical questions. 
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